This paper studies the link between economic performance and social networks in West Africa. Using first-hand data collected on 358 small-scale traders in five border markets between Niger, Nigeria and Benin, we are particularly interested in testing whether the most wellconnected actors of trade networks are also the most successful in terms of monthly sales and profit. The paper shows that the overall economic performance of traders is affected by the socio-professional position of the actors with whom they are connected. While social ties with local religious leaders have no effect on their business, support received from civil servants, politicians, and security authorities translates into economic performance. The paper also shows significant differences between countries, regions and marketplaces. Social connections developed with state representatives have a much greater effect on economic performances in Niger and Benin than in Nigeria, where average profit is much higher. Experience is more closely correlated with profit in the region where traders have developed re-export trade activities than where petty trade is the dominant form of business.
Introduction
Social networks play a crucial role in African economies. Unlike industrialized economies in which economic exchange is mainly based on impersonal transactions made possible by formal market institutions, African economies rely heavily on interpersonal relationships between entrepreneurs (Fafchamps 2004) . Social networks allow entrepreneurs to develop trust relationships in a business environment where information transmission is slow and costly, access to credit is difficult, and contracts are not strictly enforced by formal institutions. While personal acquaintances are relatively unimportant in developed economies due to the predominance of arm-length ties between firms, trust acquired through repeated business transactions and interpersonal contacts strengthen the African entrepreneurs' ability to adapt to unforeseen problems, and provide a better access to resources. In the particular field of trade, for example, social networks allow traders to do business with a larger number of suppliers, increase their access to capital and credit, and provide opportunities to build informal relationships with state officials that control imports and exports.
Social networks, however, do not benefit all equally (Urwin et al. 2008 ). Because they rely primordially on trust, they tend to promote the well-connected rather than the most qualified.
If membership in a network can compensate for market imperfections and increase productivity, it also creates or amplifies distortions in the labor market. Being too embedded in a set of interpersonal relationships may also have disadvantages because a high level of embeddedness decreases the ability of traders to reach actors beyond their own group. It also limits the possibilities of gains because every business partner provides more or less the same products or services. Much larger gains can accrue to less embedded actors, who can be potentially more complementary to each other, have different ideas and better exploit cultural or monetary differentials. The pressure from kin that goes with social obligations between network members in Africa can also be a threat to economic activities, pushing African entrepreneurs to evaluate the costs and benefits of developing social ties through kin.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to study the link between economic performance and social networks in five West African border markets. Using first-hand data collected on 358 small-scale traders located in Niger, Nigeria and Benin, we are particularly interested in testing whether the most well-connected actors of trade networks are also the most successful in terms of monthly sales and profit. In other words, we wish to determine 3 whether the overall economic performance of small-scale traders is affected by the socioprofessional position of the other actors with whom they are connected.
The border settings make the study of social networks particularly interesting for two reasons.
Firstly, the presence of a border introduces an artificial distance between business partners (Parsley and Wei 2001) in a business environment already characterized by high transport costs. We therefore assume that local traders will rely heavily on social connections with other traders that can provide information on prices and demand, and reduce the uncertainty associated with the crossing of national borders. Secondly, border regions are well known for providing a favorable environment to informal economic activities, for which the process of production and distribution is illicit but the final product is licit (Portes and Haller 2005) , such as oil or second-hand clothing for example. Borders generate prices differential that well connected traders can take advantage of and remain, at the same time, institutional asymmetries that have to be negotiated. We therefore assume that local traders will engage in interpersonal relationships with state representatives that can facilitate cross-border trade and ultimately have a positive effect on economic performance.
Our results show that interactions are particularly frequent with local religious leadersknown as marabouts -and with civil servants. In the two border regions surveyed, small traders tend to develop fewer ties with politicians or security officers. The paper shows that interacting with traditional religious leaders does not have a significant effect on economic performance, despite the spiritual importance of such leaders, while support received from state representatives and politicians is converted into economic performance. Small traders use their connections to actors who have access to state resources or who can help them avoid tax and bans on certain products. Geographically, the paper finds significant differences between countries, regions and marketplaces. Social connections developed with state representatives have a much greater effect on economic performances in Niger and Benin than in Nigeria, where average profit is much higher. Experience is more closely correlated with profit in the region where traders have developed re-export trade activities than where petty trade is the dominant form of business.
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature that analyzes the impact of social networks on economic performance. Section 3 presents our methodology and describes the two border regions where data was collected. Section 4 starts by describing the 4 main socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed traders, before determining with whom they are connected. We then perform a bivariate analysis between the main sale products and profits of the traders and (1) their family background characteristics; (2) their social connections. In the rest of the paper, we conduct a multivariate analysis in order to identify a network effect on the profit of the traders and study whether there are significant differences between countries, regions, and markets.
The impact of social networks on economic performance
The study of how social relations affect economic outcomes constitutes a rapidly growing field of research in social sciences (Granovetter 2005 , Fafchamps 2006 ), particularly as an approach to understanding employment opportunities, professional inequalities, innovation, and trade. In developed economies, particular attention has been paid to the role of social networks in matching workers and firms in the context of imperfect information on job markets. Social networks have proved beneficial for workers, who can obtain information about jobs through personal contacts, and for firms, who can reduce uncertainty about employees' actual productivity through references and letters of recommendations (Schmidt and Jensen 2012) . The economic benefits of social networks are particularly evident for highly-qualified workers, whose social connections help them access non-redundant information and earn higher wages, and for knowledge-intensive firms competing for a limited pool of potential jobseekers (Goyal 2012) . These findings obtained in developed countries also seem to hold true in the highly fragmented market of Sub-Saharan Africa, where a majority of workers are self-employed, have low levels of qualifications, and where informal recruitment procedures based on word-of-mouth are dominant. Evidence from South Africa (Burns et al. 2010 , Hofmeyr 2010 , Schöer et al. 2012 , Ethiopia (Mano et al. 2011, Caria and Hassen 2013) , and Burkina-Faso (Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer 2013) , among others, indicates that social networks enhance employment opportunities.
Social networks also prove effective in shaping the diffusion of new technologies. Rather than adopting new technologies randomly or following expert recommendations, early adopters often rely on their social networks to evaluate the profitability of innovation. In Ethiopia, for example, Matous et al. (2013) show that farmers are more likely to adopt a system of production that enhances productivity while preserving the environment if they belong to the same ethnic and religious group as the state agent in charge of promoting agricultural change. Studying the process of social learning in the pineapple industry in Ghana, Conley and Udry (2010) reach similar findings when they note that novice farmers introduce agricultural innovation based on their information neighborhood. In Zimbabwe, Chipika and Wilson (2006) find that technological learning, measured through investments in R&D, innovation, and quality management, is generally positively associated with networking. In a number of small and medium enterprises, however, strong kinship ties have a negative effect on technological change, mainly because they prevent manufacturers with a low level of education to access external resources, illustrating the Janus face of social networks.
In addition to favoring job matching and innovation, social networks can also enhance manufacturing and trade. In a study conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, Akoten and Otsuka (2007) show that micro-manufacturers who had developed business links with traders are more likely to adopt new technologies and to produce higher quality products than those who sold directly to consumers. Similar findings were found by Ishiwata et al. (2014) in Ethiopia, who show that the density of ties between micro-enterprises affect positively the sales and the skills of the manufacturers. In their study of the relationships used by agricultural traders in Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (1999) also find that more successful traders are better connected and make extensive use of embedded ties rather than arm-length transactions. The social networks developed among traders enhance productivity by helping them obtaining information about prices and market conditions, negotiating and enforcing contracts, obtaining loans, ensuring the regularity of trade flows, and reducing risks. In another study conducted in Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (2002) assess the economic performance of traders' networks, taking into account the possible endogeneity of networks indicators.
Measuring social capital -defined as "the advantage created by a person's location in a structure of relationships" (Burt 2005: 4) -by the number of contacts with others traders, suppliers and clients, they show that these variables positively influence the economic performances of the traders, even after controlling for endogeneity and other econometric shortcomings. They demonstrate that the main channels through which social capital affects traders' profit are better information on prices, the trustfulness of clients and suppliers, and potential access to commercial credit.
Considering the benefits of social networks in economics, one could expect the relation between embeddedness and economic success to be linear, with the most connected actors 6 being also the most successful. This linear relation would only be limited by the number of stable social relationships that an individual can sustain during his life -known as the Dunbar's number (Hill and Dunbar 2003) . However, the building of social ties also entails network diseconomies, which explain why the relation between the two variables is nonlinear and follows an inverted U-shape curve (Uzzi 1996) . Network diseconomies can be explained by the fact that the effects of social networks on economic outcomes do not depend only on the number of social connections, but also on the structural position of the actors to which one is connected. Social actors can gain power through their ability to be connected to a large number of other actors, or to bridge several clusters of actors. In the first instance, the most important actors have a high degree centrality, meaning that they are connected to many others, whereas the actors bridging clusters have a high betweenness centrality, and are usually known as brokers (Burt 1992 ).
On one hand, central actors intensely embedded in a local cluster of close friends and associates are unlikely to be very successful in business, because they lack the brokerage ties that could allow them to reach external resources, such as foreign business partners of a different ethnic or religious background, for example. They are also vulnerable to social obligations, which in Africa are well-known for undermining prosperous businesses or prevent enterprising individuals to develop innovative activities (Whitehouse 2012) . On the other hand, brokers that exclusively rely on external ties are also unlikely to become successful entrepreneurs since they lack the internal linkages within local clusters that provide the structural basis for trust and solidarity (Wellman 1988) .
As a consequence, African entrepreneurs are forced to find a balance between internal linkages within their cluster of closely-knitted acquaintances, and brokerage ties built beyond their local community (Walther 2014) . As Burt (2005: 97) argues, "Brokerage is about coordinating people between whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust. Closure [embeddedness according to the author] is about making it safe to trust. The key to creating value is to put the two together, building closure around valuable bridge relations". This tradeoff -known as the entrepreneur's dilemma -appears to be valid in a wide range of domains and regions, from apparel firms in the United States (Uzzi 1996) to the shoe and garment industry in Nigeria (Meagher 2010) , and international trade in Brazzaville (Whitehouse 2011) . The markets of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba (hereafter GaMaKa), and of Birni N'Konni and Illela (BNI) are geographically close to each other (less than 10 km) and form two highly integrated markets between which local traders are used to develop business ties (Walther 2009 (Walther , 2012 . The survey questionnaire was designed to collect information on the social network of the traders, and various information on their business, including monthly sales 8 and profit. The sample is made of 358 small traders from these border markets surveyed from March to May 2012 (Table 1) .
Due to the absence of reliable information on the population of traders in both countries, we defined a small trader as a businessman whose annual turnover is smaller than 100 FCFA million (€152,000). This amount is widely regarded by local freight agents as a relevant threshold between small traders mainly engaged in petty trade and large traders able to develop transnational activities. Small traders were selected with a "pseudo-random" selection technique: A given number of small traders were assigned to every street in the market according to its length and density. For every street, every tenth small trader with a fixed position has been selected, in any direction. Proving a causal relationship between the structure of social networks and economic outcomes has proved challenging. On the one hand, social networks can generate externalities and improve business performance by enhancing productivity and reducing uncertainty. On the other hand, wealthy entrepreneurs can be more connected because they can afford the cost of maintaining social connections over the long term, thus attracting a large number of dependents which they can control. Studies using relational approaches have tackled this issue by looking at differences in social connections within groups in order to understand variations in economic behavior across entrepreneurs faced with similar incentives (Goyal 2012) . The idea here is that the social structure -not the attributes of the actors -had direct effects on individual behavior. Burt (1992) , for example, argues that positions in the social structure are the direct cause of the observed outcomes, and not the attributes of the social actor, such as age, gender or race. The correlation observed in many developing societies 9 between women (attribute) and lower education (outcomes), for example, is not direct, since it is socially mediated by gender relationships (Buchmann et al. 2008) . In other words, it is not because of their gender that most women are less educated than men, but because the relationships between men and women amplify gender differences and ultimately induce a lower priority for female education.
The boundaries of social networks are difficult to establish because they usually depend on the type and intensity of interactions considered between social agents (Marsden 2012) . In Africa, this problem is even more accurate due to the fact that social interactions are pervasive and kinship relationship, religious or ethnic connections are particularly frequent.
In the literature, some authors have restricted their study of networks to formal membership, family, and kinship (Fafchamps 2004) or have asked the interviewees to name those they considered as part of their active network. This last approach suffers from the potential for recollection bias and of the fact that the respondent himself determines inclusion criteria.
In this paper, networks are measured with a more neutral procedure. Firstly, using a predefined list of given social and administrative positions -including religious leaders, police, customs officer, senior civil servant, mayor, and member of parliament -small traders were asked to state whether they knew the incumbents of those positions and if yes, whether they had ever been in contact with them. Secondly, small traders were asked to name other people they considered important for them including family members or relatives. For any listed person or position, a set of questions were asked to measure the intensity of the social ties. These questions included the frequency of contacts and the benefit of any support or advice. Our underlying hypothesis in using this approach was that the performance of a small trader as measured by his monthly sales would mostly depend on the quality of his network as measured by the social position of the identified members. Finally, detailed socioeconomic information on parents of the traders was collected. These background characteristics are used later as covariates during the empirical analysis.
In our survey, the economic performance of small traders is measured by two indicators: the monthly sales and the monthly profit as estimated by the traders themselves. Measuring the economic indicators of small traders, who usually do not keep account of their income and expenditure, is not an easy exercise because of memory biases. This declarative approach has nonetheless been widely used in employment surveys to measure the earnings of entrepreneurs and self-employed workers. In our study, the profit and the sales were collected based on de Mel et al.'s (2009) approach, who tested the self-reporting of profit through a unique question against various alternative methods: detailed reporting of sales and expenses, usage of account diaries, etc. Their analyses showed that the declaration of the total profit through one unique question was robust compared with alternative methods. Instead of collecting the exact amount, enumerators were instructed to collect this information by intervals. The use of intervals reduces non response rate given that some traders are reluctant to provide the exact amount of their monthly sales and profit. Finally, even if profit and sales are subject to measurement errors, these errors do not affect the estimation of regressions coefficients, as far as they are not correlated to the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002 ).
Empirical method
The article uses both descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. Descriptive analysis relies on univariate and bivariate tables and charts of frequencies and means to provide the network profile of small traders and to display a snapshot of profit levels across countries.
Descriptive statistics are supplemented with multivariate regression analysis. The following regression analysis framework was used:
where: P is a monthly profit of the small trader, measured in CFA Francs (100 CFA=0.15€); N is a vector of network indicators which captures the family background (father's job) and the set of people that the trader knows and interacts with; X is a vector of other covariates which contains traders characteristics (gender, education, experience) and an indicator of the goods sold; and i identifies the small trader. The vector of coefficients of interest α captures the correlation between profit and network after controlling for the effect of other factors.
The equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The use of OLS restricts the scope of the interpretation of some of our results. The causal link between social networks and profit cannot be fully elaborated because of unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality.
The case for reverse causality is however limited because most small traders suggested during the survey that they themselves initiated the contacts with incumbents of listed positions.
Results

Description of the main variables
The socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents (Table 2) 
Importance of social networks
The social networks were measured with a parsimonious approach aiming at identifying a small set of important individuals to the traders. Our results indicate that small traders know on average two people listed as incumbents in a social or administrative position (Table 3 ).
The most prominent social position is the Islamic spiritual and political teacher, known as marabout in North and West Africa (Butler 2006) , which was cited by 46% of the traders. 
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During the survey, information on the type of support (if any) solicited from the network was also collected. The results confirm that small traders do rely on their network (Table 3) . Six out of ten have received support or advice from one of the incumbent listed in our survey. A large majority (82%) of small traders knows at least one person with a higher socio-economic position and 61% have received support or advice from them. 
Bivariate analysis
This section presents the correlation between business characteristics, measured through sales and profit, and some of the trader's characteristics, in particular their father's occupation. It is anticipated that family background and the current network will be correlated. The multivariate regression analysis used later allows us to investigate conditional correlations.
In the sample, 33% of the small traders are sons of traders, whereas this proportion is 46% for the sons of farmers. Parents help their offspring in different ways. They can encourage and train them to sell goods, connect them to potential customer, or provide capital. During the survey, data were collected on the main products sold by small traders and their sales. The biographies show that many traders did not change their main sale products over time. where traders whose father was also in the trade business have monthly sales of more than 100,000 FCFA (€152) higher than average traders. In what follows, we wish to determine whether the average monthly profit of traders is positively or negatively affected by the people with whom they are connected. Table 5 shows that interacting with marabouts has a detrimental effect, unlike having connections with other categories of actors, which offers a premium of about 25,000 FCFA (€38). This is a quite important difference since it represents approximately the monthly minimum wage in West Africa. It is in Niger and Benin that the social ties with senior, political and security officers make a larger difference (more than 25,000 FCFA) whereas the difference is only 10,000
FCFA (€15) in Nigeria. Sources: authors
Because of the border location of the markets, we are also interested in investigating whether the social ties developed with representatives of the state have an effect on small traders' business activities. In order to do that, we disaggregate the social network of small traders into three categories of state representatives: senior civil servants, politicians and security officers, which may include custom officers, gendarmes and police officers. These latter actors are officially in charge of security, law and rules enforcement but can also ease smuggling of goods across the borders and hence favor the traders with whom they interact.
Our analyses presented in Table 6 show, however, that the security officers are not the most profitable contacts with whom small traders work. Indeed, when considering all countries together, small traders in relationship with a senior civil servant gain about 159,000 FCFA (€242), compared to 152,000 FCFA (€231) for those in relationship with a politician and a little less for small traders who received support from security officers. This pattern varies across countries. In Niger, a connection with a senior civil servant is the most rewarding, followed by a connection with a security officer, whereas being in relationship with a politician is less rewarding. In Benin, things are reversed since being in a politician's network yields much more returns, followed by security officer and lastly, senior civil servant. In Nigeria, there is no difference between being connected to a politician or to a security officer and the most profitable connection is to a senior civil servant, which corresponds to an additional gain of 13,000 FCFA (€20). Sources: authors
Multivariate analysis of profit
The bivariate analysis has indicated some correlations between profit and a set of network indicators, especially in Niger and Benin. However, we cannot draw conclusions regarding the effect of the network based only on this descriptive analysis because profits are likely to be influenced by other factors as well. Therefore, we turn to multivariate analysis in order to evaluate which of the social and economic characteristics of small traders have a significant influence on their business activities. Table 7 .1 presents our estimated parameters. For each country and for the overall sample, we estimate two sets of regressions based on the categories of actors previously defined (marabout, senior civil servant, politician, security officer) and discuss the statistically significant coefficients. The estimations confirm what has already been previously highlighted: for small traders of Niger and Benin, being connected to a representative of the police, customs or political sphere is valuable. In Niger, the actors connected to such agents gain 34,000 FCFA (€52) more than those which are not connected, while in Benin, the premium associated with such connections is twice as high. Being in connection with a marabout still has a negative impact on small traders' profit, but the effect is not statistically significant.
More generally, our findings show that the impact of the network on the economic performance of small traders depends on the type of person with whom they are connected, suggesting that some social ties are far from being efficient from a purely business point of view. -13,007 -14,844 -22,305 -24,305 -14,047 -15,771 -25,437 -22,047 (16,979) ( -25,819 -27,316 -22,504 -22,536 -11,614 -15,507 -50,252 -36,166 (19,849) ( That is particularly the case of being in relationship with a marabout, which doesn't provide great financial benefit but is nevertheless actively sought by small traders for spiritual Other network relations are always associated with positive outcomes, even if this effect is not always statistically significant. The positive effect of connections to politicians or senior civil servants can be explained by a conversion of social capital to economic capital: in these countries, small traders that are connected with politicians and senior civil servants can call on their financial support to increase the scope of their activities. In some cases, traders and politicians or senior civil servants can even be partners, the latter providing funds and the former investing these funds. Given that they are in charge of enforcing law and rules related to trade, other state representatives can use their position to favor traders with whom they are in contact. As to family background, there seems to be a leverage effect of family tradition in trade in Niger and Nigeria. Those whose fathers were also traders lead more profitable businesses than those whose fathers are involved in agriculture, or even other non-farm activities in the specific case of Niger. When children perform the same activity as their fathers, they can benefit from specific "know how" linked to that activity (Pasquier-Doumer 2012). This intergenerational transmission of experiences is not significant in Benin.
Surprisingly, education level, which is an important determinant of individual productivity, has no significant impact on business profit in any of the countries. Having attended school does not seem to help in informal trade of the border regions of Niger, Benin and Nigeria.
This result challenges those founded by Kuepié et al. (2009) who showed that education was still rewarding even in the informal labor market of some of the capital cities of West African. The fact that education doesn't contribute to economic performance is a matter of concern since it's an important component of human capital, which is known to be an engine of economic growth. The absence of this effect could be the result of the discrepancy between the training received and the abilities required for trade. The other human capital factor, work experience, has a positive impact on informal trade, except in Benin.
So far, our analysis has mainly documented the consequences of social relations for economic outcomes in the countries where small traders were surveyed. In what follows, we look at the estimated regression coefficients in the two border regions surveyed and in each border market individually. The rationale behind this analysis is that some regions or market places may have unique characteristics, which can positively or negatively influence trade activities.
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The first two columns of and politicians prevails within the groups of markets. The striking difference between them is on experience as trader. While experience is not related to profit in BNI, it is positively correlated to profit in the GaMaKa region. This correlation may be related to the historical development of trade between the markets of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba, which originated in the 1980s following the liberalization of international exchanges. This period was favorable to the development of re-export trade of second-hand textiles, which were imported free of custom duties through the port of Cotonou in Benin, transported by trucks to the markets of Malanville or Gaya, from which they were then illegally exported to Nigeria, where their import is banned (Walther 2009 ). The revenues generated by such trade have contributed to the creation of a diaspora of foreign traders in the GaMaKa region, which contrasts with the autochthonous business community of Birni N'Konni and Illela.
Conclusion
In this paper, we used firsthand data collected in five borders market located between Niger, Nigeria and Benin to investigate the role of social network on small business performances as measured by monthly profits.
The analysis shows that more than a third of the small traders surveyed interact with local religious leaders (marabouts) or civil servants, whereas contacts with politicians or security officers are less frequent (one tenth). Small traders receive various form of support from these categories of actors. The support received from civil servants, politicians, and security authorities is converted into economic performance. This conversion is channeled through two mechanisms: the mobilization of financial capital through connections to actors who have access to state resources and the non-compliance to law and rules concerning taxes or bans on certain products thanks to the collusion with security authorities. Interactions with traditional religious leaders have no significant effect on economic performance, despite the spiritual importance of these actors. We also found that education, widely regarded as an important determinant of productivity and income, does not have a significant impact on traders' economic performance. This result could be the reflection of a misalignment between education curricula and the need of labor market. On contrary, work experience prove to have a positive impact on the traders' profit.
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Our study also shows that geographic space is a determinant of business activities. Social connections developed with state representatives have much more effect on economic performances in Niger and Benin than in Nigeria, where only the professional experience and the family background of small traders actually influence their economic performance. The fact that social networks pay off, at least in Benin and Niger, reflects, to a certain extent, market imperfections in accessing credit, and in enforcing rules and laws. As a consequence, those who can rely on an effective network are better off than those left out. By providing access to capital, suppliers and customers, and reducing transaction costs, social networks facilitate the development of flexible and informal ties between West African businessmen.
They are, however, not frictionless, and can also hamper the evolution of business, because deeply embedded actors are often conservative about whom they do business with, which can make it hard for newcomers to enter a market and bring new ideas. In the two regions studied, the effectiveness of social network can be considered a source of inequality and a distortion to a fair competition, which could incite Niger and Benin authorities to set up adapted policy measures to make the labor market functioning with less distortion.
